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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
As its title suggests, the aim of this study is to report a 
series of considerations regarding the reception, and 
exceptional survival, of the praesumptio muciana from Roman 
law1 into Catalan law, until the reform of the 1960 Compilation 
in 1984.  
 
This investigation is fully justified in view of the fact that 
only the Compilation of Special Civil Law of Catalonia of 1960, 
albeit with some variations, maintained this presumption with 
the same structure and, at first sight, the same objective as in 
Roman law, in which it had already undergone development.  
 
Although it is true that the praesumptio muciana of Roman 
law appeared in the Partidas, specifically in Partida 3, 14, 2, 
                                                          
* Published in Spanish, with some alterations, under the title Algunas 
consideraciones sobre la praesumptio muciana en el Derecho romano y su 
recepción en el Derecho catalán, in Libro Homenaje al Prof. Armando Torrent, 
published by Dykinson, Madrid, 2016, pp. 241-263, at pp. 252-263. This is a 
more extended work by P. DOMÍNGUEZ and E. Mª. POLO ARÉVALO, 
which also looks at the configuration of the concept in Roman law. 
 
1 For an examination of this presumption in the light of Roman legal 
sources, see the recent study by DOMÍNGUEZ and POLO ARÉVALO, 
Algunas consideraciones sobre la praesumptio muciana, cit., pp. 241-251. 
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customary law was against it, and thus at the end of the XIV 
century Law 203 of the Leyes de Estilo replaced it with another 
(reproduced by the Nueva Recopilación 5, 9, 1 and the Novísima 
Recopilación 10, 4, 4),  which constitutes the precedent for the 
current presumption of jointly owned property of the Spanish 
Civil Code (art. 1.328 of the Draft of the Civil Code of GARCÍA 
GOYENA, originally art. 1.407 of the Civil Code, now art. 
1.361). 
 
Thus, article 23 of the Compilation was the only rule which 
remained faithful to the Roman law tradition and was based on 
its original spirit, although after numerous criticisms of the 
original wording the reform of 1984 replaced the Roman 
presumption, a rule of evidence linked to the social and family 
environment for which it was devised but not in any way to the 
social context of the time, with a “bankruptcy-related 
presumption”, which is significantly different and based on a 
different system in line with what is laid down in art. 1442 of 
the Spanish Civil Code (Law 11/1981, of 13 May). 
 
II. RECEPTION OF THE PRESUMPTION INTO 
CATALAN CIVIL LAW  
 
Although it is true there have been many interpretations of 
the so-called praesumptio muciana of Roman law, and of its 
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original function2, it may be defined as a presumption 
according to which property acquired by a woman while she is 
married, or to be more precise property possessed by her3, the 
origin of which can not be proved, is presumed to come from 
her husband. Thus, by virtue of this presumption, which was of 
a clearly procedural nature as it only applied in the context of 
court dispute between a wife and her husband or his heirs 
concerning ownership of a good or goods unlawfully held by 
the wife, in the course of marriage4, it was considered that the 
husband, unless proven otherwise, was the owner of said good 
or goods5 or that he had made a gift of it to his wife.  
 
The Roman law praesumptio muciana passed into medieval 
common law, and from there, it came to form part of Catalan 
civil law6. Commentators of the Ius commune, particularly 
                                                          
2 See id. n. anterior, pp. 244 ff. 
 
3 Cfr. VIRGILI SORRIBES, F., Proyección de la presunción muciana en Derecho 
común (Presentation to the Academia Madritense del Notariado 9 December 
1955), in Anales de la Academia Madritense del Notariado, X (1959), p. 293. 
 
4 As made apparent in the text of POMPONIUS, D. 24, 1, 51 5 ad Quintum 
Mucium: …cum in controversim venit,… 
 
5 See in this regard, MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, L., Régimen jurídico de las 
presunciones, Madrid, 2007, p. 169. 
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Catalan commentators (such as BALDO, BARTOLO, CANCER, 
FONTANELLA, MENOCHIO, FABRO…), discuss the use of 
the Roman presumption and although it is true they throw a 
little more light on various questions it raised, by application of 
Roman law, it is also the case that there are important questions 
which remain unclear7.  
 
At this point history, MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN points 
out, the presumption would also be applied to cases in which 
the wife was able to demonstrate acquisition by onerous title 
from a third party, it being presumed iuris tantum that the 
consideration or price paid came from the husband. Indeed, as 
the author notes, in the Ius commune it appears that this 
presumption referred to this case of “external acquisition” by 
the wife. And therefore, on the understanding that the husband, 
unless proven otherwise, provided the consideration, the main 
object of discussion was to determine if what should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
6 Cfr. among others, PUIG FERRIOL, LL., L’estat civil de dona casada segons 
dret vigent a Catalunya, Barcelona, 1971, p. 65; PARA MARTÍN, A., 
Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones entre cónyuges en Cataluña, 
Barcelona, 1981, p. 21; TORTORICI PASTOR, C., En torno a la muciana 
moderna del artículo 1442 del Código Civil, in Anuario de Derecho Civil, 43-part 
1 (1990) pp. 1189 ff., p. 1191. 
7 PARA MARTÍN, ibidem, pp. 21 and 26. In line with this it should be 
pointed out, for example, that these commentators rejected what is today 
called the “theory of real subrogation”, as they distinguish between, and 
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presumed as having been donated and, thus, to be restored, 
was the good acquired by onerous title or the money 
(compensation) paid8, this last solution being the one accepted 
by historical law9. 
Turning now to the subject of this article, it should be 
stressed that although the praesumptio muciana, in its Roman 
law formulation10, was included in the Partidas, specifically in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
include in the presumption, the thing and the price paid for it (see his 
citations in TORTORICI PASTOR, op. cit, pp. 1191-1192, ns. 5-9).  
 
8 MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, Régimen jurídico de las presunciones, cit., p. 
98. 
 
9 Cfr. ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, L., Les presumpcions de donació del deutor 
concursat al seu cònyuge. A propòsit de l’article 78. 1 de la Llei 22/2003, de 9 de 
juliol, concursal, in Revista catalana de Dret Privat, 5 (2005) pp. 11 ff, p. 15; 
MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, id. previous note.  
 
In general, regarding this second phase, see DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, J., 
El régimen matrimonial de separación de bienes en Cataluña, Madrid, 1974, pp. 
170 ff; PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit., p. 
21 ff; CUENA CASAS, M., La protección de los acreedores en el régimen 
económico matrimonial de separación, Madrid, 1999, p. 30; ASÚA 
GONZÁLEZ, C. I., La presunción muciana concursal, el artículo 1.442 del 
Código civil, Valencia, 2000, p. 16. 
 
10 Known also in civilist doctrine as the “traditional praesumptio muciana”. 
In this regard, cfr. among others, ÁLVAREZ OLALLA, M. Mª., 
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Partida 3, 14, 211, custom was opposed to it and, at the end of the 
XIV century, Law 203 of the Leyes de Estilo replaced it with 
another (reproduced in the Nueva Recopilación 5, 9, 1 and the 
Novísima Recopilación 10, 4, 4) which constitutes the precedent of 
the presumption of the community of accrued gains12 (art. 1.328 
of the Draft Spanish Civil Code of GARCÍA GOYENA of 1851, 
art. 1.407 of the Civil Code, today art. 1.361). Thus, the 
praesumptio muciana disappeared from Spain’s common civil 
law13, as the Civil Code of 1889, in line with the Napoleonic 
Code of 1809 and the other civil codes which followed it in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Responsabilidad patrimonial en el régimen de separación, Pamplona, 1993, pp. 
333 ff.; CUENA CASAS, ibidem; ASÚA GONZÁLEZ, op. cit. 
 
11 See Las siete Partidas del Sabio Rey Don Alonso IX, con las variantes de más 
interés, y con la glosa del Lic. Gregorio López, II, Barcelona, 1844, pp. 274 ff. 
 
12 “Como quier que el derecho diga que todas las cosas que han marido, e 
muger, que todas presume el derecho que son del marido fasta que la 
muger muestre que son suyas. Pero la costumbre guardada es en 
contrario, que los bienes que han marido, y muger, que son de ambos por 
medio, salvo los que probare cada uno que son suyos apartadamente…” 
(= El Fuero Real de España, diligentemente hecho por el noble Rey Don Alonso 
IX, glosado por Alonso Díaz de Montalvo, I, Madrid, 1781, p. 66). 
 
13 In short, as TORTORICI PASTOR notes, in En torno a la muciana moderna, 
cit., p. 1.200, the disappearance of the “muciana” and the acceptance of the 
presumption of joint ownership is a result of the evolution in the 
matrimonial property regime in common civil law. 
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course of that century, did not contain it14. In Spain, although 
the presumption remained in force in Catalonia, the Balearic 
                                                          
 
14 With codification, the praesumptio muciana, in its Roman formulation, 
disappears from common civil law, but the concern for fraud, an idea until 
that date not associated with the presumption, as pointed out by ARNAU 
I RAVENTÓS, Les presumpcions de donació del deutor concursat, cit., p. 15, 
justified the incorporation within the Codes of commerce, only in favour 
of creditors (first, of husband declared bankrupt and, later, of either 
spouse in that position), of a presumption which continued to be called 
“muciana”, given that it had its origins in Roman law, but which 
presented notable differences from the earlier presumption and formed 
part of a different regime. This modern version of the praesumptio muciana, 
known as the doctrine of the “praesumptio muciana for bankruptcy”, was 
included for the first time in art. 547 of the Code de commerce of 1807, this 
model being followed by Italy (art. 673 of the Codice di commercio of 1865), 
Belgium (art. 555 C. de c. of 1865), Germany (paragraph 45 of the 
Konkursordnung of 1877) and Mexico (arts. 1549 and 1550 C. de c. of 1884). 
Concerning the French precept, its influence on later texts and the way in 
which this new version was adopted in other European countries, see 
VIRGILI SORRIBES, Proyección de la presunción muciana, cit., pp. 326 ff.; 
TORTORICI PASTOR, op.cit., pp. 1.993 ff.; and the bibliography cited by 
ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, ibidem, p. 15, n. 11.  
Likewise, regarding the disappearance of the praesumptio muciana for 
bankruptcy from certain European legislations, including France (art. 542 
Code du commerce was repealed by the Law of 13 June 1967) and Germany 
(paragraph 45 KO was declared unconstitutional by the Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of 24 July 1968), see ASÚA GONZÁLEZ, La 
presunción muciana concursal, cit., pp. 24 ff.  
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Islands and Navarre, precisely because of the application of 
Roman law, it only managed to survive in Catalan civil law, as 
art. 3. 3 of the Balearic Compilation (approved by Law 5/1961 
of 19 April)15, and law 103 c) of the Compilation of the Foral 
Civil Law of Navarre (approved by Law 1/1973 of 1 March), 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
In Spanish law, under art. 1442 of the Civil Code (Law 11/1981 of 13 May, 
by which certain articles of this Code relating to filiation, parental 
authority and the matrimonial property regime were modified) and art. 12 
of the Family Code of Catalonia (Law 9/1998 of 15 July); in the legislative 
studies for the reform of the bankruptcy law (art. 264 of the APLC 1983 
and art. 79 of the PAPLC 1995), the decision was taken not only to uphold 
this presumption, but to transfer it from the civil code to the law 
regulating bankruptcy. In keeping with successive attempts to reform 
bankruptcy law, Law 22/2003 of 9 July, transferred the praesumptio 
muciana for bankruptcy from the civil code to that of bankruptcy, with a 
regulation that clearly differs from the aforementioned precedents and the 
law then in force until its approval, that is, arts. 1442 of the Civil Code and 
12 the Catalan Family Code. 
  
15 Transcribed in the same terms in the Consolidated Version of the 
Compilation of the Civil Law of the Balearic Islands (approved in 
Legislative Decree 79/1990 of 6 September): “The goods that belong to 
each of the spouses on the establishment of the regime of separate 
property and those they acquire by means of any title while this regime 
remains valid, shall be considered the the private property of each of 
them” (English translation). 
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when the regime for the separation of goods was agreed to16, 
removed it from their respective foral regions.   
 
Before the entry into force of the Catalan Compilation of 
196017, in the absence of any rules of general application 
concerning the presumption originating from the laws of the 
Principality itself, it was enforced in Catalonia, as has been said, 
by virtue of the “roman rules” as supplementary law18, with the 
                                                          
16 Reproduced by Foral Law 5/1987 of 1 April (which modified the Compilation 
of Navarre) and in which it can be read (English translation) “It shall be 
presumed that the goods and rights for which there is no record of private 
ownership belong to the two spouses in equal and undivided halves”.  
 
17 Law 40/1960 of 21 July, on the Compilation of the Special Civil Law of 
Catalonia. 
 
18 Cfr. among others, LALINDE ABADÍA, J., Capitulaciones y donaciones 
matrimoniales en el derecho catalán, Barcelona, 1965, p. 170; PARA MARTÍN, 
La presunción muciana en el Derecho civil de Cataluña, in Estudios jurídicos 
sobre la mujer catalana, Barcelona, 1971 pp. 19 ff; Id., Presunción muciana y 
nulidad de donaciones, cit., p. 58; ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, Les presumpcions de 
donació del deutor concursat, cit., p. 16; MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, 
Régimen jurídico de las presunciones, cit., p. 16; LINARES, J. L., Notas sobre la 
incorporación de la praesumptio muciana al inventario institucional de la 
Compilación del Derecho civil especial de Cataluña de 1960, in Revista General de 
Derecho Romano (IUSTEL), 16 (2011) pp. 1 ff, p. 11.  
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exception of the area of Tortosa, in which it was applied under 
the provisions of the Costums of that county19.   
                                                          
 
19 Costums of Tortosa, 5, 1, 8: “…On per ço si s’esdeu que ella ensems ab lo 
marit fa nuyl contrayt de compres o de vends o d’altres contrats, et el nom 
de la Muller en les compres o els altres contrayts sia posat e entitolat, tota 
via es entes que tot es feut dels bens del marit e comprat, e que la muller 
no y ha re donat ne pagat ne mes del seu propri, si no toto dels bens del 
marit, si doncs ella o sos hereus no provarem legalmet que ella del seu 
propi hi hagues pagat. Exceptat aço, que pot venir a successio els bens del 
marit mort entestat, desfallentes els davallants los ascendents et els 
collaterals, ans que nuly altre Fisc o altre” (version of LALINDE ABADÍA, 
id. previous n.). =“The wife can not obtain any benefit from the gains or 
improvements that her husband makes ... for which reason if she together 
with her husband enters into contracts of purchase, or of sale, or of any 
other nature, even though her name is in the contract and she appears as 
titleholder, it shall be understood that this agreement has been made with 
her husband’s goods and that she has neither offered nor paid anything 
that is hers; unless she or her heirs can legally prove otherwise” (English 
translation based on modern Spanish version in ROCA SASTRE, R. Mª., 
Derecho hipotecario, Vol.  III, 5ª ed., Barcelona, 1954, p. 196 and n. 3).  
In relation to this text LALINDE ABADÍA, Capitulaciones y donaciones 
matrimoniales cit., pp. 171-172, comments that the Roman presumption is 
contained in the customs of Tortosa, but somewhat unusually, since by 
solely considering the joint sale and purchase agreements entered into by 
the husband and wife, the presumption does not respond to the 
foundations that had inspired Quintus Mucius Scaevola, as in this instance 
there is no suspicion whatsoever of inept acquisition or conjugal infidelity. 
This claim is supported by PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad 
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Thus, as can be see, in Spanish state the praesumptio 
muciana of Roman law only survived in Catalonia, article 23 of 
the Compilation of 1960 being its sole exponent20 until the 
reform of 198421, when the original praesumptio muciana ceased 
to have any effect in Catalan law, giving way to an instrument 
of protection of creditors in the event of the bankruptcy of a 
married person22, in line with the provisions of the Spanish 
Civil Code. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
de donaciones, cit., p. 21, who concludes that no Catalan legal text prior to 
the Compilation incorporated the Roman norm.  
On this fragment of Customs, see RICART, E., Desvanecimiento de la 
presunción muciana en el derecho familiar catalán, in La prueba y los medios de 
prueba: de Roma al Derecho moderno, Madrid, 2000, pp. 635 ff, pp. 652-654.  
 
20 On the Law of the Catalan Government (Ley de la Generalitat) concerning 
the legal capacity of women and spouses of 19 June 1934 and the survival 
of the praesumptio muciana in Catalan law, see the accurate observations of 
PARA MARTÍN, in Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit., pp. 29-
30 
 
21 Texto Refundido de la Compilación del Derecho Civil Especial de Cataluña 
(English translation = Restated Version of the Compilation of the Civil 
Law of Catalonia), approved in Legislative Decree 1/1984 of 19 July.  
 
22 Art. 23 (English translation): “In case of the insolvency or bankruptcy of 
one of the spouses, if they are not legally or de facto separated, the 
property acquired by the other spouse by onerous title in the year prior to 
the declaration, or retroactively from a date specified in the judgment, 
shall be presumed as having been donated by the bankrupt spouse, except 
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The praesumptio muciana, as correctly stated by GETE-
ALONSO at the beginning of his commentary on art. 23 of the 
Compilation, is a question discussed (English translation) 
“Especially in the (sc. Catalan doctrine)…immediately prior to 
the Compilation and after it, as…in the older literature it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
that the latter, on making the acquisition, or before this event, possessed 
sufficient income or any other kind of resources to make the acquisition”. 
  
There is no doubt, as stated by ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, Les presumpcions de 
donació del deutor concursat, cit., p. 50, that the reform of Law 13/1984 of 20 
March of the Compilation of the Special Civil Law of Catalonia, was the 
most significant milestone in the evolution of Catalan law, which on this 
subject has now arrived at the current art. 231-12 of the Civil Code of 
Catalonia, a provision that regulates the presumption of donation between 
spouses in the event of bankruptcy, that is, the so-called praesumptio 
muciana in case of bankruptcy, in which it is established that (English 
translation) “1. In case of one of the spouses being declared bankrupt, the 
property acquired by the other spouse by onerous title in the year prior to 
the declaration shall be subject to the following regime: a) If the 
consideration for the acquisition proceeds from the bankrupt spouse, the 
property shall be presumed to be a gift. b) If the bankrupt party cannot 
prove the origin of the consideration, it is presumed the gift amounts to 
half the price paid. 2. The presumption made in paragraph 1.b is 
destroyed if it can be proved that, at the time of the acquisition, the 
acquirer had sufficient income or funds to make the acquisition. 3. The 
presumptions established by this article shall not apply if the spouses 
were legally or de facto separated at the time of the acquisition”. 
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attracts very little attention. Either because it did not give rise to 
dispute (Roman law was applied) or because it was considered 
obsolete”23. In other words, while the so-called “official legal 
tradition”, represented by such authors as VIVES Y CEBRIÁ, 
DURAN Y BAS, DE BROCÀ, PELLA Y FORGAS, BORRELL I 
SOLER24, hardly refers to the old rule of evidence of Roman 
law25, the Catalan legal tradition immediately prior to the 
                                                          
23 GETE-ALONSO, Mª. C., Comentario al art. 23 de la Compilación de 
Cataluña, in Comentarios al Código civil y Compilaciones forales, dir. by Mauel 
Albaladejo, XXVII, vol. 1, Madrid, 1981, p. 423, n. 1 with bibliography. In 
the same sense, LINARES, Notas sobre la incorporación de la praesumptio 
muciana, cit., p. 11. 
 
24 ROCA, E., in his introduction to the re-publication of the work of DE 
BROCÀ, G. Mª.,  Historia del Derecho de Cataluña, especialmente del Civil y 
Exposición de las Instituciones del Derecho civil del mismo territorio en relación 
con el Código civil de España y la jurisprudencia (1st ed. 1918), Barcelona, 1985, 
p. 17, underlines that with this re-publication the Ministry of Justice 
begins the publication of the work of the most representative Catalan 
jurists, “that is, of those who have constituted what has been referred to as 
the ‘Catalan legal tradition’”. This initiative, in the words of the author 
(English translation) “is extremely useful for knowledge of what could be 
described as the ‘official legal tradition’, as the works of the classic authors 
were up until a short time ago only known through quotations in works of 
Catalan jurists of the XIX and XX centuries. These are the jurists that have 
delimited the current structure and scope of Catalan civil law, as well as 
the sources of knowledge”. 
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Compilation and subsequent to it, as shown by the studies of 
the praesumptio muciana in the civil law of Catalonia, “is better 
documented”26. 
 
Art. 23 of the Catalan Compilation of 196027 provides 
(English translation) that “The property acquired by the wife 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
25 In the same sense PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad de 
donaciones, cit, p. 27, states that after the old legal authors, commentators 
of Common Law, “there was a long barren period of doctrinal vacuum”. 
On this question, see LINARES, Notas sobre la incorporación de la 
praesumptio muciana, cit., pp.11-13. 
 
26 LINARES, op. cit., pp. 13-15.  
 
In the words of PARA MARTÍN, ibidem, pp. 27-28 (English translation), “at 
the end of the XIX century, DURÁN Y BAS breaks this lethargy in 
discussions concerning the praesumptio muciana, by including it in art. 99 of 
his Draft annex to the Civil Code (…) Before the Compilation, there are no 
more than the valuable contributions of VIRGILI SORRIBES and ROCA 
SASTRE”. In the opinion of LINARES, Notas sobre la incorporación de la 
praesumptio muciana, cit., p. 15, what is said by GETE-ALONSO makes it 
necessary to modify the general idea, expressed by E. ROCA in his 
introduction to the re-publication of the work of G. Mª. DE BROCÀ, cit., p. 
17, that the “official legal tradition” constitutes (English translation) “a 
sort of bottleneck of the Catalan legal tradition that conditions any 
subsequent discussions”. 
 
27 Precept located in chapter III (“On gifts between spouses”) of title III 
(“On the matrimonial property”) of book 1 (“On the family”). Recall that 
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during the marriage, whose origin can not be justified, shall be 
presumed to be a gift from the husband. If the wife justifies the 
said acquisition, but not that of the price with which it was 
made, it shall be presumed that the price was donated by the 
husband. Article 20 and the others included in this chapter will 
apply to these donations “28. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
art. 7, included in chapter I (“General provisions”) of the same title and 
book, provides that (English translation): “The economic regime of the 
spouses shall be agreed in their nuptial contracts, which can be granted 
before or during the marriage, by notarial deed, and shall be deemed 
irrevocable except in the cases provided for in this Compilation. In the 
absence of agreement, the marriage will be subject to the separate property 
regime which recognizes for each spouse the ownership, enjoyment, 
administration and free disposal to their own property, without prejudice 
to the specific dowry regime, should this apply”. 
 
28 The antecedents of this article lie in art. 99 of the Draft annex to the Civil 
Code of DURÁN Y BAS (contained in his Memoria acerca de las instituciones 
del Derecho civil de Cataluña, Barcelona, 1883, pp. 74 and 94), which 
establishes (English translation) that “The property acquired by the wife 
during her marriage is presumed to have been donated by the husband, if 
it is not fully justified that the property or its price have a different origin”; 
and in art. 38 of the Draft written in 1955 by the Commission of Jurists, 
according to which (English translation), “The property of the wife, 
including money, and other assets invested in the acquisition of other 
goods, shall be presumed to have been donated by her husband, if she 
cannot justify who she acquired them from. This shall be understood 
without prejudice to the husband's rights over property in his wife's name 
due to simulation or fiduciary duties”. (= Proyecte d’Apèndix i materials 
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This reading of the precept highlights that while it 
incorporates the praesumptio muciana of Roman law, it is equally 
true that its content varies (D. 24, 1, 51 and C. 5, 16, 6)29, by 
establishing that not only the property acquired by the wife, 
during the marriage30, is presumed to have been donated by the 
husband if the wife is unable to demonstrate any other origin 
(that is, by title of acquisition), but also, in defect of the above, 
that when the wife has proof of this acquisition (provided the 
property was obtained by onerous means) but not of the origin 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
precompilatoris del dret civil de Cataluya, Barcelona, Generalitat of Catalonia, 
Department of Justice, 1995, p. 783). On these antecedents, see also FAUS, 
R. and CONDOMINES, F. A., Comentaris a la Compilació del Dret civil de 
Catalunya, facsimile of first edition (Barcelona, 1960), with a foreword by 
Robert Follia Camps and two annexes, prepared by the College of 
Notaries of Catalonia, Barcelona-Madrid, 2003, pp. 63-64; PARA MARTÍN, 
Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit, pp. 31 ff. Likewise, it should 
be noted along with MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, Régimen jurídico de las 
presunciones, cit., p. 167, n. 459, that (English translation) “there is 
abundant case law from the Supreme Court, and from lower courts, on the 
subject, and interesting doctrinal comments recorded by DELGADO 
ECHEVERRÍA, El régimen matrimonial de separación de bienes, cit., pp. 181-
198”. 
 
29 In the same line, MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, ibidem, p. 167. 
 
30 On the questions raised by the factual basis of the presumption, see 
PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit, pp. 87-107 
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of the price with which the acquisition was made, then what is 
presumed as having been donated by the husband is the price31. 
 
Thus, as recognised by the communis opinio, this article 
established two successive presumptions, so that the 
elimination of the first possibly giving rise to the subsidiary 
application of the second, provided that onerous title of 
acquisition could be proved, but not the source of the price 
paid. 
 
In the case of the first presumption, that is, with regard to 
the goods that the wife acquires during marriage and whose 
source can not be justified, note that if we interpret this ad 
litteram, it would be unlikely to be applicable, as either the 
husband or his heirs would be unable to prove that the thing 
was acquired by the wife during the marriage (which is not 
presumed), or, if this was proved, it would be possible to 
demonstrate its origin in the sense of art. 23, and, consequently, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(analysis of the terms “property/goods”, “acquired, “during the 
marriage”). 
 
31 For a summary of the contributions made by studies of the praesumptio 
muciana in the civil law of Catalonia in the period immediately before the 
Compilation and in the years after it, see the comments (glosa) on art. 23 by 
FAUS and CONDOMINES, in Comentaris a la Compilació del Dret civil de 
Catalunya, cit., and also GETE-ALONSO, Comentario al art. 23 de la 
Compilación de Cataluña, cit., pp. 355 ff.  
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the first presumption would be overturned32. For this reason, as 
ARNAU I RAVENTÓS points out33, part of the doctrine 
proposed substituting the legal expression of the precept 
“property acquired” with “property possessed”, as this reading 
would allow the presumption that the property possessed by 
the wife, during the marriage, whose source could not be 
verified, had been donated by her husband34. Finally, it should 
be added that in our opinion the proposed wording would be 
                                                          
 
32 Cfr. among others, ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, Les presumpcions de donació 
del deutor concursat, cit., p. 51; MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, Régimen 
jurídico de las presunciones, cit., p. 168. 
 
33 Id. previous n.  
 
34 This interpretation can be attributed to PARA MARTÍN, La presunción 
muciana, cit., pp. 94-95. The author, in Presunción muciana y nulidad de 
donaciones, cit, p. 95, states that (English translation) “a logical 
interpretation of art. 23 of the Compilation leads us, therefore, to the 
consideration that the term “goods acquired” covers both cases – albeit 
infrequent – in which the actual title is proved, and those in which there is 
only proof of possession by the wife acquired during the marriage”. 
However, see DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, El régimen matrimonial de 
separación de bienes, cit., pp. 216-217, which argues a different opinion. In 
the view of PELAYO HORÉ, S., La presunción muciana, in Revista de 
Legislación y Jurisprudencia, 42 (1961) pp. 793 ff, p. 826 (English translation), 
“the wife fails to demonstrate the origin of property acquired in the case of 
money in her cupboard”. 
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in line with what was stated by QUINTUS MUCIUS 
SCAEVOLA by way of POMPONIUS, in D. 24, 1, 5135 . 
 
As regards the second presumption of the precept, it 
would only be applicable when the wife could prove that the 
acquisition was by onerous title, but was unable to justify the 
origin of the price paid36. In this case it is the price which is 
presumed to have been a gift from the husband to the wife37. 
 
In view of the above, it may be stated in line with the 
general doctrine that the double presumption of the precept 
                                                          
 
35 Quintus Mucius ait, cum in controversiam venit, unde ad mulierem quid 
pervenerit, … 
 
36 As pointed out by ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, Les presumpcions de donació del 
deutor concursat, cit., p. 52, n. 82, there was likewise no consensus 
concerning the type of justification that could be accredited by the wife. 
On this question see the bibliography cited by the author, ibidem. 
 
37 As the civil doctrine points out, in the case of registrable acts a married 
Catalan women will generally have documentary evidence to overturn the 
first of the presumptions. Concerning the unnecessary character of this 
second presumption, insofar as it would be included in the first of the 
presumptions formulated in generic terms, see PARA MARTIN, 
Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit., pp. 108-110.  
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does not derive directly from Roman sources38, but rather it is a 
creation of ROCA SASTRE39, to protect, as far as possible, the 
property registration system from the effects of the muciana40. In 
                                                          
38 However, for RICART, Desvanecimiento de la presunción muciana, cit., pp. 
646 and 652, the opinion that Roman law only interpreted the praesumptio 
muciana in its original sense was inaccurate, given that the later doctrine 
extended its scope (GETE-ALONSO, Comentario al art. 23 de la Compilación 
de Cataluña, cit., p. 426). In her opinion, the reference to the Oratio Severi, in 
D. 24, 1, 32, 1 Ulp. 33 ad Sab., is clearly to what is later called by the civilists 
as “real subrogation”:“the validation extends to all the donations between 
husband and wife, including those in which the husband acquires to make 
a gift to his wife (Oratio…donationibus non solum ad ea pertinet, quae nomine 
uxoris a viro comparata sunt…). On this text, see RICART, op. cit., pp. 640-
641. The Romanist, having stated that this was noticed and did not raise 
any difficulties in Roman sources, acknowledges nevertheless that it was 
never made the object of interpretation. 
 
39 This was the view of PELAYO HORÉ, La presunción muciana, cit., pp. 824 
ff. See ROCA SATRE, Derecho hipotecario, vol.  III, cit., pp. 195 ff. 
 
40 In support of this construction, ROCA SATRE, ibidem, cites various 
constitutions of the Code, namely, C. 5, 16, 9 (a. 238 d. C.); C. 4, 50, 6 (a. 
293-304 d. C.); C. 4, 50, 8 -9 (a. 393-305 d. C.), the latte under the significant 
rubric “Si quis alteri vel sibi sub alterius nomine vel aliena pecunia emerit”, and 
also fragments of FONTANELLA.  In his view, op. cit., p. 200, in the 
Roman context the fragments are related with the rule “per extraneam 
personam nihil nobis acquirii potest”, so that, by extension, “the woman 
married under the separate property regime may never be considered an 
instrument of acquisition of her husband's property”(English translation). 
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this way, as pointed out by LALINDE ABADÍA (English 
translation)41, “it is possible to guarantee an acquisition by a 
third party, insofar as the goods fall outside the presumption 
when they are the object of normal trade”. 
 
The fact of one of the spouses, in our case, the husband 
paying so that the other acquires goods raises the question, 
according to RICART, of what the civilists refer to as “real 
subrogation”42; the Catalan legal tradition and the civil law 
doctrine highlighted in relation to the praesumptio muciana the 
idea that “it is not (only) what is acquired that is presumed as 
having been donated by the husband, but also the price 
invested in this legal transaction”43. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
The author concludes (p. 201) that, except in cases of simulation, when the 
woman under the separate property regime purchases with her husband's 
money, real subrogation does not occur, but rather the wife acquires the 
ownership of the property if it is delivered to her, and the husband only 
has a personal action for the price. 
 
41 Capitulaciones y donaciones matrimoniales, cit., p. 174. 
 
42 RICART, Desvanecimiento de la presunción muciana, cit., p. 652. 
 
43 GETE-ALONSO, Comentario al art. 23 de la Compilación de Cataluña, cit., 
cited by RICART, ibidem, p. 652, n. 37. 
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Although the classical authors of the Catalan legal tradition 
do not expressly refer to this question44, the subsequent 
doctrine, in particular during the long period of preparation of 
the Compilation, involved discussions about the object or scope 
of the presumption45, with two basic theses being formulated46, 
thus:  
 
For some, it simply had to be presumed iuris tantum that 
the property acquired by the wife originated from a donation 
received from the husband, which means that although the wife 
could accredit the (onerous) title of acquisition, but not the 
origin of the price paid, in virtue of the “theory of real 
subrogation” it should also be understood that it was the good 
                                                          
44 RICART, in Desvanecimiento de la presunción muciana, cit., p. 654, speaks 
of “donations between spouses by real subrogation”. 
 
45 GETE-ALONSO, id. n. 43, considers the culminating moment of the 
dispute occurred in the 10 years prior to the approval of the Compilation 
(1960).  RICART, ibidem, p. 656, criticises the fact that in this dispute 
(English translation) “the true Roman view of the presumption is missing, 
which was always placed at the procedural level, and whose effects were 
felt in the reversal of the burden of proof, and never at the dogmatic 
level”. 
 
46 Cfr. TORTORICI PASTOR, En torno a la muciana moderna, cit., pp. 1190-
1191. For a complete summary of the theories defended on the subject, see 
ROCA SASTRE, Derecho hipotecario, vol.  III, cit., pp. 197 ff.  
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that had been donated by the husband47; and therefore, if he 
revoked the donation he could claim the property acquired48. 
 
However, for others, the principal proponent being ROCA 
SASTRE49, when the wife could justify the source of the thing 
acquired (the title of acquisition), but not of the money spent in 
its acquisition, what should be presumed as having been 
donated by the husband was not the thing acquired, but the 
price paid for it50. Hence, when a Catalan woman subject to 
                                                          
 
47 VIRGILI SORRIBES is the main representative of this position, La 
presunción muciana y los bienes adquiridos durante el matrimonio por mujer 
catalana, in Propiedad y matrimonio, College of Notaries of Barcelona, 
Conferencias pronunciadas de los cursillos de los años 1948 y 1949, Barcelona, 
1956, pp. 195 ff; Id., Proyección de la presunción muciana, cit., pp. 277 ff. 
 
48 TORTORICI PASTOR, op. cit., p. 1191, notes that the main basis of this 
doctrine is the confusion between the thing and the price: “if the wife 
acquired a thing with money donated by her husband, the status of the 
money was transferred to the thing that it had replaced and, as such, it 
should be considered that the wife had the thing by way of a donation her 
husband” (English translation).  
 
49 Derecho hipotecario, vol.  III, cit., pp. 197 ff.  
 
50 See supra, n. 40. Commentators, such as BALDO, BARTOLO, 
MENOCHIO, FABRO and CANCER, had previously declared themselves 
in favour of the inadmissibility of the so-called “theory of real 
subrogation” (see supra, n. 7).  
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separation of matrimonial property acquired anything with her 
husband's money, there was no real subrogation, she acquired 
the ownership of the property if it was delivered to her, and the 
husband could only resort, in turn, to a personal action for the 
price.   
 
The main support or basis for the view of ROCA SASTRE51, 
which, as has been seen, is that used by art. 23 of the 
Compilation, is that under the separate property regime, typical 
of Roman law, it is not possible to apply the mechanism of real 
subrogation because there is no common patrimony, there are 
simply two patrimonies -the private patrimony of the husband 
and the private patrimony of the wife- between which there is 
no connection whatsoever; which means each spouse is the sole 
instrument of acquisition of their own patrimony52. The 
consequence of this is that if the husband, in his lifetime, 
revoked the gift, or his wife died before him, he could claim 
from her or from her heirs the money used in the acquisition, 
but not the property acquired, which belonged to the wife. In 
short, we concur with PARA MARTÍN that the solution 
adopted by the precept served to resolve the doctrinal dispute 
prior to the introduction of Compilation concerning the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
51 Id. n. 49. 
 
52 TORTORICI PASTOR, En torno a la muciana moderna, cit., p. 1191. 
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application of the theory of real subrogation to the praesumptio 
muciana; a solution which in his opinion is more in line with the 
Roman precedents than the said theory.53 
 
The praesumptio muciana of the Compilation of 1960 is, 
without any doubt, a presumption of donation and not of 
ownership54. And while it is true that art. 23 is in line with 
ROCA SATRE in its regulation of the presumption, for 
PELAYO HORÉ the same can not be said for a gift, since art. 20 
of this legal text does not consider it a valid act, although 
                                                          
 
53 PARA MARTÍN, La presunción muciana, cit., p. 49. See C. 5, 16, 9 and C. 
4, 50, 6, texts in which the author supports his opinion with respect to 
Roman law. For the opposing view, see RICART, Desvanecimiento de la 
presunción muciana, cit., pp. 646 and 652 (see also supra, n. 38). 
 
54 MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, Régimen jurídico de las presunciones, cit., p. 
169, argues that Roman law probably confined itself to presuming the 
ownership of the husband and, therefore, the Compilation added 
something more by considering that the goods regarding which the wife 
could not prove ownership originated as a gift from her husband. 
However, PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit., 
p. 108, postulates that the presumption of donation in the original art. 23 
of the Catalan Compilation adheres to historical precedents, arguing that 
although D. 24, 1, 51 does not speak of gifts, but rather of the husband as a 
source of the goods, neither does it explicitly state that the thing whose 
origin can not be justified must necessarily be presumed to belong the 
husband. 
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revocable, but rather a void act, albeit one that can be 
validated55. In his opinion, although art. 23 and, in general, the 
thesis of ROCA SASTRE being correct, the “catastrophe” occurs 
on combining it with art. 20 of the Compilation, which declares 
the nullity of donations between spouses (those made outside a 
matrimonial agreement), as instead of considering them valid 
but revocable56, this precept goes much further and considers 
them void, albeit subject to validation57. PELAYO HORÉ, after 
noting that (English translation) “art. 20 introduced a new 
                                                          
 
55 Art. 20. 1 (English translation): “Donations made between spouses 
during marriage outside the marriage contract shall be deemed void; but if 
the donor spouse dies without having repented of them or revoked them, 
they will be be retroactively validated. In case of doubt, it shall be 
considered that it was the donor’s will not to repent or revoke them”. 
  
56 In this sense, DE BROCÀ, Historia del Derecho de Cataluña, cit., p. 846, 
relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 May 1903, admitted that 
although the presumption of a gift holds (that is, as established by the 
praesumptio muciana), the gifts “are of course not void, but voidable by the 
donor” (English translation).  
  
57 On the nullity of donations under arts. 20 and following of the 
Compilation, see LALINDE ABADÍA, Capitulaciones y donaciones 
matrimoniales, cit., pp. 74-75; PARA MARTÍN, La presunción muciana, cit., 
pp. 54 ff, Id. Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit., pp. 122-124, pp. 
182-183, pp. 204 ff; DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, El régimen matrimonial de 
separación de bienes, cit., pp. 223-224.  
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formula which Roman jurists probably did not accept even in 
the time of QUINTUS MUCIUS SCAEVOLA”, a view we do not 
share58, concludes that art. 23 promoting the praesumptio 
muciana, and which was undoubtedly “meant to be prudent 
                                                          
 
58  Although the origin and basis of the rule prohibiting gifts between 
spouses can not be dealt with here, what is undeniable is that the 
prohibition was mitigated in 206 AD with a senatusconsultum from 
SEVERO and CARACALLA (Oratio Severi), at a much later date than the 
period in which the jurist QUINTUS MUCIUS SCAEVOLA lived 
(assassinated in 82 BC), and which is reported by ULPIANUS in D. 24, 1, 
32 33 ad Sab.: (pr.) Cum hic status esset donationum inter virum et uxorem, 
quem antea rettulimus, imperator noster antoninus augustus ante excessum divi 
severi patris sui oratione in senatu habita auctor fuit senatui censendi fulvio 
aemiliano et nummio albino consulibus, ut aliquid laxaret ex iuris rigore. (1.)  
Oratio autem imperatoris nostri de confirmandis donationibus non solum ad ea 
pertinet, quae nomine uxoris a viro comparata sunt, sed ad omnes donationes 
inter virum et uxorem factas, ut et ipso iure res fiant eius cui donatae sunt et 
obligatio sit civilis et de falcidia ubi possit locum habere tractandum sit: cui locum 
ita fore opinor, quasi testamento sit confirmatum quod donatum est. (2.) Ait 
oratio fas esse eum quidem qui donavit paenitere: heredem vero eripere forsitan 
adversus voluntatem supremam eius qui donaverit durum et avarum ese.  
 
In this senatusconsultum it was ordered that a gift made by the husband to 
the wife could be validated when the husband died, if he had not 
indicated his intention to revoke it. In this respect, see also C. 5, 16, 24 pr.  
 
Concerning the impossibility of identifying exactly the origin of this 
prohibition in Roman law, see RICART, Desvanecimiento de la presunción 
muciana, cit., p. 648, n. 28, with bibliography. 
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and restrained”, turned out to be “terrible”, not per se, but 
because of the influence arts. 20 and 22 had upon it 59.   
 
The original foundations for the praesumptio muciana in 
Roman law remain one of the most highly debated doctrinal 
questions, to the extent that it remains unresolved to this day60. 
However, what does not seem to be in dispute is that the 
subsequent development of this evidentiary rule led to a 
transformation of its original meaning, to its being linked, in the 
context of the Roman marriage sine manu, to the prohibition on 
                                                          
 
59 PELAYO HORÉ, La presunción muciana, cit., pp. 828 y 832. Art. 22 
establishes (English translation): “In the case of donations between 
spouses, until they are validated, the donee shall not be entitled to what is 
promised by the donor, nor shall the donee acquire ownership of the thing 
given. If it has already been delivered, the donee shall obtain simple 
possession of it; but if the donor outlives the done or regrets the donation 
or revokes it, the donor or the donor’s heirs can claim it. If the thing given 
is not susceptible to being reclaimed or comprised money that has 
subsequently been invested, the donor or the donor’s heirs may only claim 
the amount by which, at the time of the claim, the donee has grown richer 
thanks to the donation, without this amount being allowed to exceed the 
amount of the original donation”. 
 
60 On this question, see DOMÍNGUEZ y POLO ARÉVALO, Algunas 
consideraciones sobre la praesumptio muciana en el Derecho romano, cit., pp. 244 
ff. 
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donations between spouses, in order to protect the economic 
interests of the husband and his heirs in case of conflict with the 
wife or the widow regarding the source of property acquired 
during the marriage61. 
 
Various opinions have also been expressed as to the basis 
and the purpose of the presumption contained in the original 
art. 23 of the Catalan Compilation62. The opinions stated, in the 
words of PARA MARTÍN (English translation)63, “coincide 
substantially in basing the praesumptio muciana on what any 
presumption is founded: a maxim of experience. In the view of 
the legislator it is normal for whatever the wife acquires to be a 
donation from her husband”. What this does not mean, 
however, as PARA MARTÍN is at pains to point out, is that this 
was appropriate to the Catalan social reality of 1960 or in the 
years that followed64. 
                                                          
61 It has been debated whether in Roman law this presumption could also 
be extended to protect the rights of the husband's creditors. On this 
question, see DOMÍNGUEZ and POLO ARÉVALO, op. cit., n. 41. 
 
62 See GETE-ALONSO, Comentario al art. 23 de la Compilación de Cataluña, 
cit., pp. 423-444; PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad de 
donaciones, cit., pp. 121 ff. 
 
63 Ibidem, p. 119. 
 
64 Id. previous n. 
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It is not disputed that the basis for the presumption in the 
times of QUINTUS MUCIUS ESCAEVOLA was completely 
outdated by the time of the Catalan Compilation of 1960, as 
family structures by that time had nothing in common with 
those of Roman society. If we accept this, the immediate 
question is why it was maintained in Catalan civil law. A 
possible answer can be found in art. 29 of the draft prepared by 
the Codification Commission65, who saw “the muciana” as a 
rule against fraud given that it was the only grounds that could 
still be enforced, with its effects being limited to the creditors 
and heirs of the husband. But as PELAYO HORÉ has pointed 
out, art. 23 of the Compilation unfortunately diverged from this 
proposal, making it impossible to interpret the precept in this 
way66, with the presumption thus lacking an adequate basis in 
modern society (social reality of the day). 
                                                          
 
65 “Property acquired by the wife during the marriage, including money 
and assets invested in the acquisition of other goods, shall be presumed to 
have been donated by her husband, if she does not justify from whom 
they were acquired. This presumption may only be invoked by the 
husband’s heirs and creditors: the latter to the extent necessary for the 
recovery of their claims” (English translation). 
 
66 PELAYO HORÉ, La presunción muciana, cit., pp. 817-818. Contrary to this 
generally held opinion, GARCÍA VALLÉS, R., La presunción muciana y la 
Compilación de Derecho especial de Cataluña, in Revista Jurídica de Cataluña, 
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Bearing in mind the numerous criticisms which art. 23 of 
the Compilation has attracted, it suffices to say that one of the 
most controversial questions was that of whether the 
“muciana”, as set out in the provision, was designed merely to 
favour the husband and his heirs (the only ones who could 
invoke it)67, or also the husband's creditors68. On this question69 
we coincide with ARNAU I RAVENTÓS in believing that the 
creditors were excluded from the provisions of art. 23 and that 
they could not, therefore, demand the annulment of the alleged 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1965, pp. 379 ff, appears to accept this thesis under art. 23 of the 
Compilation.   
 
67 Cfr. ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, Les presumpcions de donació del deutor 
concursat, cit., pp. 52-53. 
 
68 Cfr. GARCÍA VALLÉS, ibidem. In this vein MARTÍNEZ DE 
MORENTÍN, in Régimen jurídico de las presunciones, cit., p. 165, notes that 
the praesumptio muciana had a two-fold purpose (English translation): “to 
prevent the wife's patrimony being increased unjustly at the expense of 
her husband’s and to prevent any collusion between spouses to the 
detriment of a third party”. In this same line, the author also cites 
SORRIBES and GETE-ALONSO (op. cit., p. 165, n. 452).   
 
69 See the various doctrinal opinions in favour of one or another stance, as 
well as the case law relating to the subject, in PARA MARTÍN, Presunción 
muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit, pp. 285 ff. 
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donation, having to resort to other mechanisms70. Thus, in line 
with most legal authors, it can be concluded that the 1960 
Compilation designed the praesumptio muciana as a rule of 
evidence in the interests of the financial position of the husband 
(or his heirs) and that it could only be enforced against a wife 
and, where appropriate, her heirs, thus distancing it from its 
original function in Roman law, that is, favouring the wife and, 
all cases, the honour of her husband, and thus bringing it more 
closely in line with the purpose that it ended up having in 
Roman law. 
 
We would not wish to finish this discussion without 
pointing out that the communis opinio was contrary to this 
                                                          
70 ARNAU I RAVENTÓS, id. n. 67.  Previously and in the same sense, 
PUIG FERRIOL, in L’estat civil de dona casada, cit., p. 69.  
 
On the protection granted creditors, the 1960 Compilation provided the 
following (English translation): “Under the separate property regime, all 
acts and contracts which the spouses celebrate or enter into together, 
during the marriage, involving valuable consideration shall be valid; in 
the event of judicial challenge, the proof of onerous title shall correspond 
to the defendants.” (art. 11). “Gifts made after the person making the gift 
has incurred debts shall not prejudice the creditors for those debts, 
provided that they have no other legal recourse to enforce payment.” (art. 
340. 3). See also in this regard DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, El régimen 
matrimonial de separación de bienes, cit., pp. 248 ff; PARA MARTÍN, 
Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit., pp. 285-291. 
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presumption71 and that there were thus many voices raised in 
favor of its suppression72, as there would be later in 1984 with 
the reform of the Catalan Compilation. The opposition argued 
against it on the grounds of its discriminatory nature, since it 
primarily benefited the husband73; because it constituted a 
considerable limitation on the principle of the freedom of 
contract74; and because it represented a major restriction on the 
capacity of the Catalan woman to act, leaving her property in a 
                                                          
71 In this vein PELAYO HORÉ, La presunción mucina, cit., p. 834, observed 
that the Compilation would have been more humane if article 23 had not 
been included or, at least, if the possibility of invoking it had been 
confined to creditors and heirs (next of kin), as had been proposed by the 
Codification Commission. 
 
72 On the numerous criticisms of the text in which the presumption was 
contained (art. 23 of the Catalan Compilation, 1960), see, among others, 
PELAYO HORÉ, ibidem, pp. 823 ff; PARA MARTÍN, La presunción muciana, 
cit., pp. 66-67; Id., Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, cit.; PUIG 
FERRIOL, L’estat civil de dona casada, cit., pp. 68-70; VVAA, Llibre del II 
Congrés Jurídic Català, 1971, Barcelona, 1972 (in general, the conclusions 
reached by the Congress); DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, El régimen 
matrimonial de separación de bienes, cit., pp. 205 ff. 
 
73 See for all, PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad de donaciones, 
cit., pp. 294 ff. 
 
74 PARA MARTÍN, Estudio especial de las cuestiones derivadas de la 
contratación entre cónyuges, Conclusiones de la Ponencia de la Sección Tercera 
del II Congrés Jurídic Catalá, in LLibre del II Congrès Jurídic Catalá, cit., p. 431. 
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grave situation of insecurity75. In short, it was argued that it 
failed to respond to the social reality of the family as originally 
provided for under Roman law, and, therefore, it was totally 
divorced from the Catalan social context that existed before, at 
the time of and after the issuing of the Compilation of 196076.  
 
                                                          
 
75 PARA MARTÍN, La presunción muciana, cit., p. 67; and Estudio especial, 
cit., p. 431.  
 
76 Cfr. among others, PARA MARTÍN, Presunción muciana y nulidad de 
donaciones, cit., p. 69, MARTÍNEZ DE MORENTIN, Régimen jurídico de las 
presunciones, cit., p. 166.  
